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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
ment, maintaining that on the day in question he had a case load of 40
cases in 13 different parts. In denying the motion, the court ruled that
"'where no attempt was made to hire outside counsel, and there was
indication that [the] case was prepared for trial"' 9 the policy of decid-
ing cases on the merits must yield to two superseding considerations:
the inconvenience and loss caused the plaintiff and the responsibility
of the bar to assist in ameliorating the court's calendar dilemma. €0
ARnc 55 - AiptEALs GENERALLY
CPLR 5528(a)(5): Bar advised to reproduce testimony in logical se-
quence when utilizing the appendix method.
CPLR 5528(a)(5) permits an appeal to be prosecuted by the ap-
pendix method whereby the appellant submits only so much of the
record as is material to the questions presented on appeal. This proviso
is directed at reducing the appellant's costs and easing the court's bur-
den. 61 Moreover, a thoroughly prepared appendix by the appellant can
obviate the appellee's need to print any part of the record in his own
brief.62 Because of the benefits that could conceivably be derived by
all concerned if the appendix is satisfactory, the courts have indicated
that abuses will not be tolerated and have expressed their displeasure
by withholding or imposing costs on the lax party.3
In Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Power Authority6 4 the appellant
submitted an appendix in which he presented the testimony of the
witnesses in alphabetical order rather than in the order of their ap-
pearance at the trial. As a result of this illogical sequence, the appellate
division was presented with a distorted record. Refusing to be subjected
to the chore of untangling facts from the incoherent appendix, the
court rejected it as inadequate and unacceptable.
ARTcLE 75 - ARBITATON
CPLR 7502(b): Referral of "threshold" question to arbitrator ruled
improper.
In Blends, Inc. v. Schottland Mills, Inc.65 a spinner of yarn, Tex-
tiles, sold goods to a weaver, Schottland Mills, Inc. (Schottland), which
59 64 Misc. 2d at 500, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 760.
60 Cf. Herbert Land Co. v. Lorenzen, 113 App. Div. 802, 99 N.YS. 937 (2d Dep't 1906).
61 See 7 WK&M 5528.01.
62 Cf. SEcoND REP. 354.
63 See, e.g., Richard C. Mugler Co. v. A. C. Management Corp., 29 App. Div. 2d 548,
286 N.Y.S.2d 81 (2d Dep't 1967) aff'd mem. 24 N.Y.2d 814, 248 N.E.2d 446, 300 N.Y.S.2d 591
(1969); see also Lo Gerfo v. Lo Gerfo, 30 App. Div. 2d 156, 290 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (2d Dep't
1968), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. Rnv. 498, 527 (1969).
64 35 App. Div. 2d 330, 316 N.Y.S.2d 68 (4th Dep't 1970).
65 35 App. Div. 2d 377, 316 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1st Dep't 1970).
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in turn sold to a textile converter, Blends, Inc. (Blends). In February
of 1969, Blends complained of defects in the yarn and returned it to
Textiles which issued a credit to Schottland. Textiles refused, however,
to assume responsibility for yarn which had already been processed.
On May 5, 1970, Blends served a demand for arbitration on Schott-
land and the latter served a similar demand on Textiles, contending
that if it were liable to Blends then Textiles would be liable over to
it.
The contracts between Textiles and Schottland contained a provi-
sion whereby any action of any kind must be commenced within one
year from the date the claim accrued. Consequently, Textiles moved
to stay arbitration on the ground that the claim was time-barred under
CPLR 7502(b). Inasmuch as the resolution of this objection might in-
volve an intimate knowledge of the textiles industry, the lower court
referred it to the arbitrator. 66 The First Department reversed, ruling
that the parties were free to adopt a reasonable period of limitations6 7
and that Textiles had a right to have such a provision enforced.68
It should be noted that the lower court did not purport to nullify
the contractual limitation; it merely concluded that as between itself
and the arbitrator the latter was in a better position to decide the
question of timeliness. On its face, such a position is not objectionable
since expertise is a primary motivation for agreeing to arbitrate. More-
over, though an arbitrator is usually free to disregard the time-limita-
tions objection, 69 it could be argued that his refusal to hear an issue
which the court has specifically referred to him would automatically
render the award vulnerable on the ground that the arbitrator had
exceeded his powers. 70 Nevertheless, the difference in the scope of review
is a crucial consideration. If the court denied Textile's objection on
the ground that the arbitration was not time-barred, its order would be
appealable;71 if the arbitrator considered the objection and ruled
adversely to Textile's position, the award would not be reviewable.72
Accordingly, although the lower court's approach was certainly prac-
tical, the First Department has wisely insured that the petitioner who
66 In re Textiles, Inc., 164 N.Y.L.J. 18, July 27, 1970, at 2, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 342, 367-69 (1970).
67 See N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (McKinney 1964).
68 See River Brand Rice Mill, Inc. v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 305 N.Y. 36, 110 N.E.2d
545, 113 N.YS.2d 132 (1953); see also 8 WK&M 7502.15.
69 CPLR 7502(b).
70 See CPLR 7511 (b)(1)(iii).
71 See 8 WK&M 7502.08.
72 See CPLR 7511(b)(1).
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asserts a timely objection to arbitration will not be denied judicial
consideration.
CPLR 7503(c): Court of Appeals sanctions service-not receipt-as suffi-
cient to satisfy statute of limitations; First Department decries "trick"
service of notice of intention to arbitrate.
Despite the legislative mandate that "[t]he civil practice law and
rules shall be liberally construed .. . "73 CPLR 7503(c) has been ac-
corded an extremely stringent interpretation. Postulating that the ten-
day period within which to apply for a stay of arbitration is a statute
of limitations, 74 courts have simply pointed to their inability to grant
a time extension, even when the parties have so agreed,7 as ground
for refusing to review "untimely" applications.7 6 Furthermore, by
positing that practical considerations are irrelevant when jurisdictional
issues are involved 77 courts have demonstrated little reluctance in
vitiating service of an application for a stay of arbitration where the
moving papers were not received within ten days78 or were not served
directly upon the party demanding arbitration7 9 or were served pur-
suant to the three-day extension provided by CPLR 2103(b) for service
of interlocutory papers.8 0 Interesting indeed, will be the lower court's
reaction to two recent appellate pronouncements.
In Empire Mutual Insurance Co. v. Levy8' the Appellate Division,
First Department, announced that the judiciary has not been rendered
completely impotent by CPLR 7503(c): the expiration of the ten-day
period does not preclude a subsequent application for a stay of arbitra-
tion when the notice of intention to arbitrate is deliberately served
73 CPLR 104.
74 See Jonathan Logan, Inc. v. Stillwater Worsted Mills, Inc., 31 App. Div. 2d 208, 295
N.Y.S2d 853 (1st Dep't 1968), aff'd, 24 N.Y.2d 898, 249 N.E.2d 477, 301 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1969),
discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv. 758, 760-70 (1970).
75 See General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Cerretto, 60 Misc. 2d 216, 303 N.Y.S.2d
223 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1969) (mem.). But see N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAW § 17-103
(McKinney 1964).
76 Compare CPLR 201 with CPLR 2004.
77 Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. Gilbert, 35 App. Div. 2d 21, 312 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1st Dep't
1970), rev'd, 28 N.Y.2d 57, 268 N.E.2d 758, 320 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1971).
78 Compare Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. Gilbert, 35 App. Div. 2d 21, 312 N.Y.S2d 406
(1st Dep't 1970) with Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Anness, 62 Misc. 2d 592, 308 N.Y.S.2d 893
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1970), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JonN's L. R V. 145,
173 (1970).
79 Compare State Wide Ins. Co. v. Lopez, 30 App. Div. 2d 694, 291 N.YS.2d 928 (2d
Dep't 1968) with Bauer v. MVAIC, 31 App. Div. 2d 239, 296 N.Y.S.2d 675 (4th Dep't
1969).
80 See, e.g., Monarch Ins. Co. v. Pollack, 32 App. Div. 2d 819, 302 N.Y.S.2d 432 (2d
Dep't 1969).
8135 App. Div. 916, 316 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1st Dep't 1970).
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